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Several observers commented on developments in 2016 as 
having the last word on issues that had been open for a long time. 
Some of these conclusions were not for the best. For example, the 
outcome of the referendum on Brexit, that is on the permanence of the 
United Kingdom in the European Union (EU), came as a surprise to 
many. But it certainly should not have been a shock, in a country with 
such a long history of euro-scepticism. Similarly, the widespread 
growth of so-called populist movements, including the election of 
Donald Trump in the USA, may be a predictable consequence of both 
cultural and economic trends that date back several decades now 
(Inglehart, Norris, 2016).  However it would be wrong to rest on the 
supposition that the final word has been said. First, because these 
trends are still on-going, and may still exert similar effects (e.g. in the 
forthcoming presidential elections in France). Second, because the 
new context they generated implies a need for adaptation and thus an 
opportunity for change, in economic and political terms, if not in legal 
and institutional ones.  
With a focus, by no way exclusive, on Europe, in this issue 
Tonveronachi expresses this point in very clear terms. The spirit of the 
time is clearly closed to – for the time being utopian – hypotheses of 
further centralisation of power at the EU level. Especially concerning 
fiscal policy, some member states desperately need higher fiscal 
deficits, which would provide a much needed support to aggregate 
demand, even if deficits remained within the limits of the Maastricht 
and Amsterdam Treaties. (On the other hand, one could argue that 
higher fiscal deficits in the countries that do not immediately need 
them would only be possible with more centralisation of power at the 
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EU level). More in general, it seems that looking at the increasing 
popular hostility against the EU, we will have to live with the current 
set-up for a while before significant Treaty changes will be possible 
again. As Tonveronachi argues, the current set-up is a union made up 
of sovereign countries competing under common rules. Even if some 
of the founding fathers of the EU and of the euro saw every new 
European institution as a step towards political (possibly federal) 
integration, there is now confusion and uncertainty over the final aims 
and objectives of the EU. Despite the euro being the currency of the 
European Union according to the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), several countries do not exhibit any will to 
enter the Euro Area (Montanaro, 2016) and Denmark has a right to 
potentially never enter it (“opt-out”). Moreover, even within the Euro 
Area (EA) the common rules are implemented differently and have 
different impact from country to country.  
Thus, the EU appears to be semi-permanently a multi-tier system, 
founded on competition rather than cooperation among member 
states, and in which competition does not take place on a level playing 
field.  
Moreover, opposition to any potential transfer of resources 
between member states constitutes a major stumbling block on the 
road to European unification. Such opposition arises not only from the 
fact that the few residual feelings of solidarity do not extend beyond 
national borders, but also from radically different narratives across 
countries on the nature and root causes of the euro crisis. As a 
consequence, while possibly being the most progressive way forward, 
significant mutualisation of European sovereign risks will have to wait 
for better times.  
From this perspective, “Eurobonds” are a crucial example. As is 
well known, on the 23rd of October 2011 the European Commission 
(EC) published a Green Paper on “Stability Bonds” (EC, 2011). The 
name was suggested by Mr. Barroso’s attempt to emphasise the 
financial and macroeconomic, rather than the fiscal and distributive, 
implications of the joint issuance of public debt at the EU (or EA) level. 
The Council reaction to this proposal has been underwhelming, and 
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the press gave particular echo to Ms. Merkel’s June 2012 statement 
that there would be no Eurobonds “as long as I live” (Der Spiegel 
Online, 2012). Shortly thereafter, the Commission has reduced the 
time by which Eurobonds could come into existence to a “long term 
(beyond 5 years)” (EC, 2012, p. 12), significantly after a first stage of 
full implementation of the so-called two-pack and six-pack (including 
the infamous “Fiscal Compact”) and a medium-term stage of “further 
budgetary coordination (including a possibility to require a revision of 
a national budget in line with European commitments)” (ibid.). In 
2013, the European Parliament (EP) passed a resolution considering 
“that the introduction of stability bonds would be an operation at par 
in importance with the introduction of the single currency” (EP, 2013, 
point 6). In response, “the Commission [was] of the opinion [that] 
much more work would need to be done to credibly address the 
concerns of those governments and parts of the civil society that are 
currently not yet convinced of common debt issuance” (EC, 2013). 
Finally, the three-stage process suggested in the Commission’s 
Blueprint (EC, 2012) are reiterated in the Five Presidents Report (EC, 
2015), with the strengthening of fiscal “coordination” in the second 
stage, and the fading out of common debt instruments into “a common 
macroeconomic stabilisation function” (to be agreed upon later on) in 
the third stage.  
Thus, as of 2015, stability bonds, Eurobonds, or any common 
“bonds” have disappeared from the EU dictionary, and the official 
story is that “the euro is a successful and stable currency. […] It has 
provided its members with price stability and shielded them against 
external instability” (ibid., p. 4). It hardly needs recalling that the 
employment rate in the same year was 69% in the EA, against an EU 
target of 75% and values of 62% in Spain, 60% in Italy and 55% in 
Greece, where little more than half of the adult population is 
employed. 
To tackle this situation and its worrying political consequences, 
Tonveronachi (in this issue), proposes a recipe for reform based on 
three pillars: (i) the issuance of Debt Certificates (DCs) by the 
European Central Bank (ECB); (ii) de facto overcoming of the “six-
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pack” and the other regulations that constrain members states’ 
discretion in the conduct of fiscal policy, even if within the limits of the 
Maastricht (and Amsterdam) Treaty; and (iii) reforming financial 
regulation. Thus, a specific feature of this proposal is that the three 
pillars are integrated and mutually sustain each other.  
With the publication of this article the Review hopes to start a 
debate on the future of Europe, focusing on realistic reforms of the 
economic policy architecture of the EU. From this point of view, 
Tonveranchi’s contribution is based on the premise that no treaty 
changes are plausibly within reach, and yet more radical change is 
necessary than what is envisaged by the Five Presidents Report (EC, 
2015). On a higher level, Tonveronachi’s contribution stresses the 
importance of clarifying from the start what future for the EU we want 
to envisage, in order to agree on a path towards a clear and shared 
objective.  
The editors of the Review chose this contribution to open a debate 
on the future of the EU, because the new conditions make several of 
the previous proposals, e.g. on Eurobonds, obsolete (many such 
proposals are cited in Tonveronachi’s paper).  
On the one hand, the likelihood of a Treaty change seems 
significantly lower today than in 2012, and yet its necessity is made 
more urgent both by the Brexit and the multi-tier reality of the Union. 
On the other hand, Europe’s muddling through, founded on the 
delusions of a sustainable Continental export-led growth strategy, 
created some developments different from those envisaged by the 
European Commission, 2012, or suggested by Claessens et al., 2012. 
The European Central Bank’s (ECB) expanded asset purchase 
programme has probably substituted the “Eurobills” plan aimed at 
stabilising short-term rates,1 and Tonveronachi’s first proposal is thus 
rather aimed at extending the ECB’s ability to affect the whole 
maturity spectrum of the yield curve. Meanwhile, the European 
“Banking Union” has been launched, but it needs completion in crucial 
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respects (Montanaro, 2016); and pilot “project bonds” issued by 
European Investment Banks have been received favourably by 
financial markets (Dhondt et al., 2015).2 Finally, Brexit, the election of 
Donald Trump and developments in the Middle East and in the Far 
East are again changing Europe’s global prospects and opportunities, 
despite the European debate being almost exclusively focused on 
“internal” EU issues (D’Ippoliti, 2013). 
In contrast, as shown by the two subsequent articles in this issue, 
our Review retains its international focus. Rafi et al. continue the 
debate on Islamic finance started in this journal by Askari, Krichene, 
2014; Nassif et al. close this issue by investigating recent growth 
dynamics in the BRICS countries in light of the “strong” and “weak” 
versions of Thirlwall’s law (Thirlwall, 1979; 2011b). 
The debate on Europe must proceed in parallel with discussion on 
the other regions of the world, both for the impact that these latter 
have on the EU, and for the global consequences of the dire 
predicament of Europe, which is the largest economic area in the 
world. In the coming issues, the Review will continue to contribute to 
the global discussion on all areas of the world; as much as Eurobonds 
have been expunged from the dictionary, “decoupling” can hardly 
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